Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
作者:D. Acemoglu、J. A. Robinson
DOI:10.1162/003355300555042
日期:2000.11.1
During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.
十九世纪,大多数西方社会扩大了投票权,这一决定导致了前所未有的再分配计划。我们认为,这些政治改革可以被视为政治精英为防止广泛的社会动荡和革命而做出的战略决策。发生政治转型,而不是现有政治制度下的再分配,是因为当前的转移并不能确保未来的转移,而选举权的扩大改变了未来的政治均衡,并充当了对再分配的承诺。我们的理论还为这一时期许多西方经济体的库兹涅茨曲线提供了一种新颖的解释,即民主化带来的再分配导致不平等程度下降。