作者:David Soskice、Torben Iversen
DOI:10.1162/003355300554737
日期:2000.2
Monetary rules matter for the equilibrium rate of employment when the number of price-wage setters is small, even when assuming rational expectations, complete information, central bank precommitment, and absence of nominal rigidities. If the central bank is nonaccommodating, sufficiently large unions, bargaining independently, have an incentive to moderate sectoral money wages, and thereby expected real wages. The result is an increase in the real money supply, and hence higher demand and employment. This does not hold with accommodating monetary policy since unions' wage decisions cannot then affect the real money supply. A similar argument holds for large monopolistically competitive price setters.
当价格工资制定者数量较少时,货币规则对均衡就业率很重要,即使假设理性预期、完整信息、央行预先承诺以及不存在名义刚性。如果央行不通融,足够大的工会独立谈判,就有动力调节部门货币工资,从而调节预期的实际工资。其结果是实际货币供应量增加,从而导致需求和就业增加。这不适用于宽松的货币政策,因为工会的工资决定不能影响实际货币供应量。类似的论点也适用于大型垄断竞争价格制定者。