作者:M. Ellman、L. Wantchekon
DOI:10.1162/003355300554836
日期:2000.5.1
We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a “centrist” policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, “posturing” by the strong party leads to platform divergence.
我们研究了一个政党(强势政党)控制政治动荡源头的选举;例如,如果这个政党输掉选举,它可能会煽动骚乱。我们表明,当对强势政党造成动荡的能力信息较少时,它更有可能赢得选举。这是因为当弱势政党掌握了更多信息时,它能够通过实施“中间派”政策更可靠地防止政治动荡。当对威胁的可信度存在不确定性时,强势政党的“姿态展示”导致了平台的分歧。