作者:P. Dasgupta、E. Maskin
DOI:10.1162/003355300554755
日期:2000.5.1
We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, if each buyer's information can be represented as a one-dimensional signal. When a buyer's information is multidimensional, no auction is generally efficient. Nevertheless, in a broad class of cases, our auction is constrained-efficient in the sense of being efficient subject to incentive constraints.
我们展示了高效的拍卖(在所有可用信息的条件下最大化剩余的拍卖)。对于私人价值,维克里拍卖(针对一种商品)或其格罗夫斯-克拉克扩展(针对多种商品)是有效的。我们证明,如果每个买家的信息都可以表示为一维信号,那么当存在共同价值时,维克里和格罗夫斯-克拉克拍卖可以推广以获得效率。当买家的信息是多维的时,任何拍卖通常都是无效的。然而,在大多数情况下,我们的拍卖在受激励约束的情况下是有效的,即是有效率的。