So far, bureaucratic apparatuses have been important for the analysis of both dictatorial regimes and democracies characterized by a weak political party structure like the United States. This article will elucidate the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, especially the so-called "System Kohl", by making use of Max Weber's type of administrative apparatus. I argue, that highly organized state bureaucracies and mass parties embedded in a parliamentary system do not necessarily provide effective control against the arbitrary use of power by the chancellor and party leader. Rather, they tend to establish a two-track system: while the regular organisation takes care of routine political business, decision-making shifts to informal circles shaped and dominated by a single person and maintained by the personal will for power. The analysis shows that key components of the "Kohl System" include party adherence, as a means of political leverage, the cult of personality, cronyism, patronage, and back door funding ("Bimbes").