二氯甲磺酰胺 | 64325-10-6

• 分子结构分类: 有机化合物 - 有机酸及其衍生物 - 有机磺酸及其衍生物
• 中文名称: 二氯甲磺酰胺
• 英文名称: dichloro-methanesulfonic acid amide
• 英文别名: Dichlor-methansulfonsaeure-amid；Dichloromethanesulfonamide
• CAS: 64325-10-6
• 化学式: CH₃Cl₂NO₂S
• 分子量: 164.012
• InChiKey: KGGPATRDOYEZAY-UHFFFAOYSA-N

计算性质

• 辛醇/水分配系数(LogP)：
  0.4
• 重原子数：
  7
• 可旋转键数：
  1
• 环数：
  0.0
• sp3杂化的碳原子比例：
  1.0
• 拓扑面积：
  68.5
• 氢给体数：
  1
• 氢受体数：
  3

反应信息

• 作为产物：
  描述：

  二氯甲磺酰氯 在 乙醇 、 氨 、 苯 作用下， 生成 二氯甲磺酰胺
  参考文献：
  名称：

  A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts

  摘要：

  This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power-vis-g-vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non-binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers.The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm's workforce. The analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions.The main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria: the profit maximizing and stationary equilibria. The unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient: it exhibits inefficient over-employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers' reservation wage. It confirms earlier results derived by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities. In contrast, in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark-up over the reservation wage.

  DOI：

  10.1111/1468-0262.00140

文献信息

• Clutterbuck; Cohen, Journal of the Chemical Society, 1923, vol. 123, p. 2510
  作者：Clutterbuck、Cohen

  DOI：——

  日期：——
• A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts
  作者：Asher Wolinsky

  DOI：10.1111/1468-0262.00140

  日期：2000.7

  This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power-vis-g-vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non-binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers.The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm's workforce. The analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions.The main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria: the profit maximizing and stationary equilibria. The unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient: it exhibits inefficient over-employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers' reservation wage. It confirms earlier results derived by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities. In contrast, in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark-up over the reservation wage.