Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry*
作者:Abhijit V. Banerjee、Esther Duflo
DOI:10.1162/003355300554962
日期:2000.8
This paper examines evidence of the role that reputation plays in determining contractual outcomes. We conduct an empirical analysis of the Indian customized software industry, using a data set we collected containing detailed information on 230 projects carried out by 125 software firms. We propose a model ofthe industry where reputation determines contractual outcomes. The evidence supports the view that reputation matters. Ex ante contracts, as well as the outcome after ex post renegotiation, vary with firms' characteristics plausibly associated with reputation. This holds after controlling for project, client, and firm characteristics.
本文研究了声誉在确定合同结果中的作用。我们对印度定制软件行业进行了实证分析,使用了我们收集的数据集,该数据集包含125家软件公司完成的230个项目的详细信息。我们提出了一个行业模型,其中声誉决定合同结果。证据支持声誉的重要性。事前合同以及事后重新谈判的结果,因与声誉可能相关的公司特征而有所不同。在控制项目、客户和公司特征后,这种趋势依然成立。