作者:Malcolm Chalmers
DOI:10.1111/1468-2346.00207
日期:2001.7
The Atlantic burden-sharing debate during the early part of the twenty-first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO's first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non-military international public goods—financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate-damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war.This widening of the burden-sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.
二十一世纪初的大西洋责任分担辩论与北约头五十年的辩论截然不同。西欧直接防御所需的资源急剧下降,而且有可能进一步削减。欧洲合作的逐步加强意味着欧盟正在成为许多国际制度中的一个独立行为体。关于哪些国家在国际上发挥了重要作用的辩论也考虑到了对非军事国际公益事业的贡献--为欧盟的扩大提供资金、援助第三世界、减少破坏气候的污染物排放。在这场新的多维辩论中,越来越明显的是,对某一制度贡献较多的国家在另一制度中的贡献往往少于大多数国家。例如,德国担心其为欧盟扩大所做的贡献过大,但其国防开支却远远低于法国和英国。欧洲国家对第三世界的援助是美国的三倍,对联合国预算的投入也将很快达到美国的两倍。然而,在 1999 年科索沃冲突中,欧洲国家依赖美国提供了大部分军事力量,如果未来发生海湾战争,欧洲国家的依赖程度将更高。它可能导致大西洋对话支离破碎,双方在从全球变暖到巴尔干维和等越来越多的问题上各说各话。为了避免出现这种危险的局面,美国和欧洲国家应坚持以下原则:无论是通过在科索沃派驻部队,还是承诺减少温室气体排放,所有国家都必须为解决共同问题做出贡献。然而,在确定由谁来承担多少责任时也应该有一定的灵活性。如果要使国际合作有机会奏效,一些国家就必须做好准备,通过做更多的事情来发挥带头作用。