The fate of East Timor provides a barometer for how far the normative structure of international society has been transformed since the end of the Cold War. In 1975, the East Timorese were abandoned by a Western bloc that placed accommodating the Indonesian invasion of the island before the protection of human rights. Twenty-five years later, it was the protection of the civilian population on the island that loomed large in the calculations of these same states. Australia, which had sacrificed the rights of the people of East Timor on the altar of good relations with Indonesia, found itself leading an intervention force that challenged the old certainties of its ‘Jakarta first’ policy. The article charts the interplay of domestic and international factors that made this normative transformation possible. The authors examine the political and economic factors that led to the agreement in May 1999 between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN to hold a referendum on the future political status of East Timor. A key question is whether the international community should have done more to assure the security of the ballot process. The authors argue that while more could have been done by Australia, the United States and officials in the UN Secretariat to place this issue on the Security Council's agenda, it is highly unlikely that the international community would have proved capable of mobilizing the political will necessary to coerce Indonesia into accepting a peacekeeping force.The second part of the article looks at how the outbreak of the violence in early September 1999 fundamentally changed these political assumptions. The authors argue that it became politically possible to employ coercion against Indonesian sovereignty in a context in which the Habibie government was viewed as having failed to exercise sovereignty with responsibility. By focusing on the economic and military sanctions employed by Western states, the pressures exerted by the international financial institutions and the intense diplomatic activity at the UN and in Jakarta, the authors show how Indonesian political and military leaders were prevailed upon to accept an international force. At the same time, Australian reporting of the atrocities and how this prompted the Howard government to an intervention that challenged traditional conceptionsof Australia's vital interests, is considered. The conclusion reflects on how thiscase supports the claim that traditional notions of sovereignty are increasinglyconstrained by norms of humanitarian responsibility.
东帝汶的命运为冷战刚刚结束以来国际社会的规范结构发生了多大的改变提供了晴雨表。1975年,东帝汶遭到了西方阵营的抛弃.该阵营把容忍印度尼西亚对东帝汶的入侵放在了保护人权之前。二十五年后,保护该岛平民成为这些国家最关心的事。曾经牺牲东帝汶人民权利并以此换取与印度尼西亚良好关系的澳大利亚发现自己正领导一支干预力量,对本国“雅加达优先”政策的老传统提出了挑战。本文着重描述了使得这一规范转变成为可能的国内外因素之间的相互作用。作者们探讨了导致1999年5月葡萄牙、印度尼西亚与联合国达成在东帝汶举行关于未来政治地位的全民公决协议的政治与经济因素。一个关键问题是,国际社会是否本应采取更多的行动来确保全民公决过程的安全。作者们认为,尽管澳大利亚、美国与联合国秘书处的官员们本可以采取更多的行动把这一问题放在联合国安理会的议程表上,但是国际社会已经不可能具有动员必要的政治意愿来迫使印度尼西亚接受一支维和部队的能力了。
本文的第二部分研究了1999年9月初爆发的暴力是怎样从根本改变了这些政治假定的。作者们认为,如果将哈比比政府视为一个没有负责任地使用主权的政府,那么在这样的情形下,对印度尼西的主权使用强制就是政治上可能的。作者们将重点放在为了迫使印度尼西亚接受一支国际部队,西方国家所实施的经济与军事制裁、国际
金融机构施加的压力,以及联合国和雅加达的紧张外交活动。同时,还考虑到澳大利亚有关暴行的报道是怎样促使霍华德发动了这场干预行动的,这场干预行动挑战了澳大利亚关键利益的旧有传统观念。结论部分就这一事例如何支持如下主张进行了思考:传统的主权观念由于人道主义责任的规范而日益受到制约。
