作者:Scott M. Fuess、Meghan Millea
DOI:10.1007/s12122-002-1007-5
日期:2002.6
Economists have long been interested in the seemingly cooperative nature of Japanese industrial relations. It has been hypothesized that information sharing in the wagesetting process has been used to promote efficiency. But have Japanese employers really paid efficiency wages, that is, can productivity gains be linked to pay raises? Efforts to test for efficiency wage setting face the problem of sorting out the extent to which pay influences labor productivity and vice versa. For the 1975–1997 sample period, we used an innovative statistical technique developed by Geweke to disentangle the linear association between pay and productivity growth. Efficiency wage behavior has not been the norm in Japan. Nevertheless, efficiency wage setting cannot be ruled out for some key areas of manufacturing.
长期以来,经济学家一直对日本劳资关系中看似合作的性质很感兴趣。有人假设,工资制定过程中的信息共享被用来提高效率。但是,日本雇主真的支付了效率工资吗?检验效率工资设定的努力面临着一个问题,即如何理清工资在多大程度上影响劳动生产率,反之亦然。在 1975-1997 年的样本期间,我们使用了 Geweke 开发的一种创新统计技术,以厘清薪酬与生产率增长之间的线性关系。效率工资行为在日本并非常态。然而,在制造业的某些关键领域,效率工资的设定并不能被排除。